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Whereas some people regard models of 
risky decision making as if they were sta-
tistical summaries of data collected for 
some other purpose, I think of models as 
theories that can be tested by experiments. 
I argue that comparing theories by means 
of global indices of fit is not a fruitful way to 
evaluate theories of risky decision making. 
I argue instead for experimental science. 
That is, test critical properties, which are 
theorems of one model that are violated by 
a rival model. Recent studies illustrate how 
conclusions based on fit can be overturned 
by critical tests.
Elsewhere, I have warned against draw-
ing theoretical conclusions from indices 
of fit (Birnbaum, 1973, 1974, 2008a): Fit 
changes under monotonic transformation 
of the dependent variable and scaling of 
stimuli. An index of fit depends on experi-
mental design; it depends on parameters 
and how they are estimated. Different 
indices can lead to opposite conclusions. A 
wrong model can achieve a “good” fit, and 
it can even fit better than the model used to 
generate the data. I will not add here to this 
list of problems; instead, I argue in support 
of traditional science.
A theory is a set of statements satisfying 
five philosophical criteria: (1) it is deduc-
tive in that the phenomena to be explained 
can be derived from the theory; (2) it is 
meaningful; that is, it can be tested (poten-
tially falsified); (3) predictive: if we knew 
the theory, in principle, we could have 
predicted the events to be explained; (4) 
causal: it specifies in principle how to alter 
the phenomena via manipulation; and (5) 
general: premises used in a theory are laws; 
they are not assumed or denied from case 
to case.
In deduction, when premises are true, 
conclusions must also be true. However, 
if a conclusion is assumed (or empirically 
established), it says nothing about the 
truth of the premises. Therefore, we cannot 
“prove” a theory via experiments. However, 
if implications deduced from a theory are 
false, we know the theory is false. So we can 
test a theory by testing its theorems. A test 
is an opportunity to disprove, but failure to 
disprove does not prove a theory.
The term “model” refers to a special 
case of a theory that also includes all of the 
operational definitions and simplifying 
assumptions needed to apply a theory to a 
particular paradigm.
The classic paradoxes of Allais (1953) are 
examples of critical tests. These paradoxes 
lead expected utility (EU) theory into self-
contradiction. They do not require us to esti-
mate any parameters from data, nor do we 
need to compute an index of fit, because the 
“paradoxical” behavior, if real, shows that 
no parameters will work. Models proposed 
to account for these paradoxes include pros-
pect theory (PT; Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979), cumulative prospect theory (CPT) 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992), and the 
transfer of attention exchange (TAX) model 
(Birnbaum, 1999).
Because people often make different 
responses when the same choice problem is 
repeated, it is useful to distinguish instability 
of preference due to random error from that 
due to a false theory. The true and error model 
assumes that different people may have dif-
ferent “true” preferences when presented with 
a given choice problem, that different choice 
problems may have different error rates, and 
that some individuals may have more “noise” 
in their data than others (Birnbaum, 2008c, 
Appendix D; Birnbaum and Gutierrez, 2007). 
This model provides a neutral standard for 
testing critical properties, such as Allais par-
adoxes and new paradoxes that distinguish 
between CPT and TAX.
The original version of PT had a number 
of problems that required a list of “editing 
rules,” added to excuse the model from 
potential evidence against it. For example, 
PT implied that people would violate sto-
chastic dominance in cases where all pos-
sible consequences of one gamble are better 
than the best consequence of the other. So 
a rule was added to say that people satisfy 
dominance whenever they detect it, but 
it did not say when people detect it. CPT 
solved this problem, because it implies that 
people always satisfy stochastic dominance, 
apart from random error.
A configural weighting model (Birnbaum 
and Stegner, 1979), implies that dominance 
is not always satisfied. A simple version of 
this model was fit to risky decisions, where 
it was renamed the TAX model, and a rec-
ipe was constructed for choices in which 
the model predicts a violation (Birnbaum, 
1997). Here is an example:
Urn A contains: 85 Tickets to win $96
5 Tickets to win $90
10 Tickets to win $12
Urn B contains: 90 Tickets to win $96
5 Tickets to win $14
5 Tickets to win $12
One ticket will be drawn randomly from the 
chosen urn, to determine the prize. Which 
urn would you choose? According to CPT, 
people should prefer B. One need not esti-
mate any parameters, because CPT makes 
this prediction for any set of parameters and 
any monotonic value and probability weight-
ing functions. Although TAX can satisfy sto-
chastic dominance (EU is a special case of 
TAX), it violates dominance in this choice 
for plausible parameters (Birnbaum and 
Navarrete, 1998; Birnbaum, 2004a, 2005, 
2008b).
A critical property is a theorem of one 
theory that is violated by a rival. In this 
case, CPT with any parameters implies 
people must choose B (apart from random 
error), but TAX with parameters predicts 
A. Such choices have now been tested with 
thousands of people, using a dozen formats 
for presenting choices. About 60–70% of 
undergraduates violate CPT by choosing A 
instead of B, contrary to stochastic domi-
nance, in a single choice of this type. When 
corrected for unreliability of responses, the 
estimated rate of “true” violation is even 
higher (Birnbaum, 2004b, 2008b, Table 11).
According to the TAX model, the util-
ity of the gamble is a weighted average 
of the utilities of the consequences, with 
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weights that depend on probability and 
on the ranks of the consequences. Because 
the weighting function for probability is 
negatively accelerated, a branch with five 
tickets (0.05) ends up getting relatively 
more weight compared to its objective 
probability, which causes A to appear bet-
ter because the 0.05 branch to win $90 in 
A (and the 0.05 branch to win only $14 in 
B) get more weight.
Other critical tests also refute CPT. 
Empirical studies of 12 theorems of CPT 
show that neither version of PT can be 
retained as descriptive of risky decision 
making (Birnbaum, 2008b,c).
Brandstätter et al. (2006) proposed the 
priority heuristic (PH) based on an index 
of fit assessing how this model performed 
in describing the data used to generate 
the model. The PH is a variant of a lexi-
cographic semiorder (LS) used by Tversky 
(1969) to describe violations of transitivity. 
They claimed PH was more often correct 
in predicting modal choices than either 
CPT or TAX, both of which are transi-
tive models. But these conclusions reverse 
when parameters are estimated instead 
of fixed in advance; they reverse when we 
consider different sets of data, and most 
important: they reverse when we examine 
critical properties designed to test these 
theories.
The family of LS, including PH, must 
satisfy interactive independence. People 
should make the same decisions in these 
two choices:
Choice 1:
Urn C contains 90 tickets to win $100
10 tickets to win $5
Urn D contains 90 tickets to win $50
10 tickets to win $20
Choice 2:
Urn E contains: 10 tickets to win $100
90 tickets to win $5
Urn F contains: 10 tickets to win $50
90 tickets to win $20
According to PH, people should choose D 
(over C) and F (over E) because the low-
est consequence is better and the differ-
ence ($15) exceeds threshold. According 
to any member of the LS family (with dif-
ferent orders of examining the attributes, 
different psychophysical functions on the 
attributes, and different thresholds) a per-
son should either choose C and E or D and 
F, or be indifferent in both, but she should 
not switch, except by error, because any 
attribute that is the same in both alterna-
tives (here probability is the same) should 
have no effect. Instead, the true and error 
model indicated that 63% of those tested 
switched their true preferences from C to 
F (after correcting for preference instabil-
ity due to random error), demonstrating 
an interaction between probability and the 
prizes (Birnbaum, 2008c).
Other critical tests also refute LS and 
PH (Birnbaum, 2008c, 2010). PH may 
have looked “good” by means of an index 
of fit applied to certain studies using fixed 
parameters, but it has not been successful 
in predicting new results.
If a critical test is satisfied, it does not 
mean that the theory that implies it is “vali-
dated,” “confirmed,” or “proved.” It merely 
means that the theory that implies it can be 
retained. However, the greater the number of 
interesting predictions that a theory makes 
that are satisfied, the more we are likely to bet 
on its predictions in the future. Thus, confi-
dence in a theory can grow by induction, but 
scientific theories are always open to revision 
or refutation based on new evidence.
Does testing theories via critical proper-
ties mean that there is no role for model-
fitting and parameter estimation? No. These 
serve two important functions: First, we 
should try to learn from our data where a 
model fits poorly, in order to devise new 
tests that have the potential to refute the 
model. Second, parameters are used to 
devise new tests between rival models.
For example, PH was devised to account 
for previously published data, such as those 
of Tversky (1969) who reported viola-
tions of transitivity consistent with a LS 
(Brandstätter, et al., 2006, 2008). Transitivity 
is the assumption that if A is preferred to 
B and B is preferred to C, then A should 
be preferred to C. Because PH can account 
for violations of transitivity and models like 
EU, CPT, and TAX cannot, transitivity is a 
critical property that has the potential to 
refute both CPT and TAX.
Just as the TAX model had been used 
to construct a test of stochastic domi-
nance where violations of CPT should be 
observed, PH has been used to design new 
tests of transitivity to search for predicted 
violations of TAX and CPT that satisfy this 
critical property.
Birnbaum and Gutierrez (2007) and 
Regenwetter et al. (2010, 2011) carried out 
such tests, using designs similar to those of 
Tversky (1969), but they were not able to 
find much, if any, evidence for the predicted 
intransitive behavior. Birnbaum and Bahra 
(2007) devised three interlaced designs in 
which PH predicted violations of transitivity. 
Although they found evidence that perhaps 
as many as 4% of participants were partly or 
momentarily intransitive, they were not able 
to refute transitivity for the vast majority 
of cases. The PH was correct in predicting 
modal choices in only 18 of 60 new choices 
devised to test its predictions (30%).
This case illustrates how conclusions based 
on an index of fit can be ephemeral. What 
looks good by an index applied to selected 
data can look horrible when that model and 
its parameters are used to predict the results 
of a new study testing critical properties.
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